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Indigenous Culture and Symbolic Violence. 
 
 
The notion of ‘symbolic violence’ is normally taken to imply a relationship between the 
dominant and the dominated.  It is also normally taken to imply that a relationship is being 
described in which victims are non-physically abused or raped.  In other words, the term is 
linguistically value-laden in that it seems to register disapprovingly a situation in which 
impotent innocence is corrupted by vicious and arbitrary power.  The assumption normally is 
that there is a Rousseauistic nuance to the expression:  we are born free but are everywhere 
enchained by symbolic violence.  In short, I think the normal usage of the term ‘symbolic 
violence’ tacitly acquiesces in a dualistic orientation which, in turn, reinforces a form of 
Manichaeanism, a binary division of good and bad.  I think it is important to contest this usage.  
I shall hope to show that Bourdieu was committed to a pluralistic relationalism.  By arguing that 
the term properly operates in a multi-variate relational context, I shall hope to show that 
Bourdieu’s analyses, and analyses conducted in accordance with his intentions, transcend some 
of the embodied oppositions in which we are trapped, particularly in international and 
pedagogical relations. I hope what I say will also stimulate some discussion about the validity of 
Bourdieu’s relationalism in his analysis of masculine domination when he was confronted by 
the, perhaps, absolute, biological dualism of gender relations. In this way, I hope to make a 
contribution to the attempt to ‘establish a correspondence between the analysis of gender order 
and that of other forms of exclusion’.  It will be clear that I am raising questions which Bourdieu 
discussed himself brilliantly in the beginning of La domination masculine (Bourdieu, 1998), but 
I want to try to go back to the origins of his thinking. I shall look in some detail at the 
development of Bourdieu’s thinking related to this topic and, importantly, I shall digress 
substantially to consider the implications for our interpretation of ‘symbolic violence’ of 
Bourdieu’s particular philosophy of social science.  I should say that I have felt obliged to 
pursue this exploration in this kind of way because there is currently a tendency in the UK to 
represent Bourdieu as a ‘post-colonial thinker’1, one who recognised both the actual and the 
symbolic violence perpetrated by French colonial forces in Algeria and who documented the 
suffering of indigenous Algerians.  This is to distort Bourdieu’s work.  It is to see him as a 
sociological Frantz Fanon and falsely to reinforce a dualistic vision, or, as Bourdieu would put 
it, a division between, in this instance, ‘indigenous’ and ‘endogenous’ and between ‘Black skin’ 
and ‘White masks’2. 
 
The reality of Bourdieu’s position is much more complicated and sophisticated.  In the interview 
of 1985 between Bourdieu and Axel Honneth and others, entitled “Fieldwork in Philosophy”, 
Bourdieu retrospectively argued that in his work in Algeria he had been pursuing an interest in 
‘la phénoménologie de la vie affective’ [the phenomenology of affective life] – testing a 
philosophical position empirically or, more accurately, recognising that phenomenology, as 
developed by the late Husserl, logically entailed continuous empirical enquiry.  The 
consequence of Bourdieu’s phenomenological orientation was that he sought to apprehend 
phenomena in a presuppositionless manner or to ensure that his attempt to comprehend 
phenomena operated with conceptual categories which did not abuse their pre-existing, 
objectified, categoral characteristics.  On the first page of his first book – Sociologie de 
l’Algérie, (Bourdieu, 1958) – Bourdieu confronted the problem of how he should attempt to 
describe social relations within a unit which was only in the process of becoming politically 
                                         
1 See a forthcoming number of the Sociological Review devoted to ‘Post-colonial Bourdieu’. 
2 Note Bourdieu’s comment;  “But above all I wanted to get away from speculation – at that time, the works of 
Frantz Fanon, especially The Wretched of the Earth, were the latest fashion, and they struck me as being both false 
and dangerous”.  (Bourdieu, 1990, 7). 
existent.  He was conscious that he was attempting to describe culturally plural societies or 
communities subsisting in physically different conditions and isolated geographically and 
linguistically – Berbers, Arabophones, the Kabyles, the Shawia, and the Mozabites – in terms of 
a political identity – Algeria – which was itself a colonial construct: 
 
“It is obvious that Algeria, when considered in isolation from the rest of the Maghreb, 
does not constitute a true cultural unit.  However, I have limited my investigation to 
Algeria for a definite reason.  Algeria is specifically the object of this study because the 
clash between the indigenous and the European civilizations has made itself felt here 
with the greatest force.  Thus the problem under investigation has determined the choice 
of subject.” (Bourdieu, 1958, 5; 1962a, xi) 
 
Long before he had articulated the notion of ‘symbolic violence’, Bourdieu was aware of the 
dangers of nominalism, of himself analytically perpetrating symbolic violence by reinforcing the 
conceptual categories of French political administration, abusing the intrinsic diversity of a 
situation which had to construct its own nationhood.  Bourdieu was caught in an objectively 
dualist condition in that he was an endogenous observer of indigenous cultures, writing an 
account of ‘Algeria’ for the Presses Universitaires de France and a reading public of 
metropolitan France.  His dilemma was that he wanted both to establish his own credentials in 
terms of Western European intellectual traditions and also write within the Algerian situation as 
what he would subsequently call a ‘participant objectifier’, situating himself within what he was 
observing in such a way that his analyses might contribute to the latent process of Algerian self-
definition.  Unfortunately, the dominant discourse within which to communicate his perceptions 
within the French tradition at the time was Lévi-Straussian social anthropology.  To satisfy the 
expectations of this discourse, Bourdieu modified Sociologie de l’Algérie in its second edition 
(Bourdieu, 1961) to offer the kinds of binary diagrammatic analyses fashionable at the time -  
following the dualisms of Lévi-Strauss’s ‘cooked’ and ‘raw’.  To satisfy his participatory 
inclinations, by contrast, Bourdieu became involved in the statistical and ethnographic research 
which led to the publication, in two volumes, of Travail et travailleurs en Algérie. (Bourdieu, 
1963).  Methodologically, Bourdieu’s intention was to observe phenomenologically the process 
of acculturation of Algerian tribespeople from traditional to modern social organisation, from 
rural to urban living.  Following the precedents of American acculturationists, like Melville 
Herskovits3, Bourdieu represented the status quo ante of tribal social organisation in Sociologie 
de l’Algérie as a base-line against which to measure the cultural adaptation of the immigrants to 
Algiers whom he and his team of Algerian researchers interviewed for Travail et travailleurs en 
Algérie.  In terms of the analysis of affective adaptation, Bourdieu focussed, in Part II of the 
book, on the experiences of Algerian people who had forcibly migrated to Algiers, but the 
statistical analysis of Part I takes as its object the totality of Algerian society, providing 
information on Algerians and colons alike – population figures, details of employment across 
communities.  As Bourdieu recollected again in 1985: 
 
“I left for Algeria while I was in the army.  After two hard years during which it was not 
possible to do anything, I devoted myself to fieldwork.  I began by writing a book with 
the purpose of casting light on the drama of the Algerian people and also on the 
colonists, whose situation was no less dramatic, beyond their racism.” (Bourdieu, 1986b, 
38).4 
                                         
3 For a fuller discussion of this influence on Bourdieu, see Robbins, D.M. (2007a) 
4 This passage is in the English translation (Bourdieu, 1986c) of the German text of the interview (Bourdieu, P., 
1986b).  The passage does not appear in the French version of the interview published in Choses dites (Bourdieu, 
1987), nor in the English translation of the French text (Bourdieu, 1990).  It is cited by Yacine, 2004. 
 
In the period between 1958 and 1963, I am suggesting that Bourdieu’s work was trapped within 
three different kinds of dualistic framework.  First there was the dualism of his own situation as 
a colonial ethnologist observing the social behaviour of Algerians.  We could call this his 
situational dualism. Second, there was the dualism of the dominant structuralist discourse in 
which he sought to transmit his ethnographic findings.  We could call this his discursive 
dualism.  Third, there was the temporal dualism implicit in the acculturation model, the 
assumption that the phenomenon to be measured was the real, temporal accultural adaptation of 
people living in Algeria, the assumption, in other words, that we can identify, isolate, or retrieve 
knowledge of  prior states of being so as to analyse the process of adjustment to new states.  We 
could call this the accultural dualism.  
 
To embark on my short philosophical digression, I want to argue that Bourdieu’s philosophical 
training had made him particularly sensitive to the problems inherent in these dualisms.  We 
know that Bourdieu produced, under the supervision of Henri Gouhier for a diplôme d’études 
supérieures in 1954, a dissertation which was a translation of, and a critical commentary on, 
Leibniz’s Animadversiones in Partem Generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum.  Unfortunately, 
it seems likely that no copy of this study is extant and we can, therefore, only speculate about 
the nature of its content in relation to the development of Bourdieu’s thinking.  Speculation is 
helped by Bourdieu’s recollection, in the “Fieldwork in Philosophy” interview of 1985 already 
quoted, that, whilst at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, he had followed the classes of, amongst 
other philosophers of science, Martial Guéroult, at the Collège de France.  In his Esquisse pour 
une auto-analyse, Bourdieu especially highlighted (Bourdieu, 2004, 21) Guéroult’s Dynamique 
et métaphysique leibniziennes of 1935 as one of the two great works – the other being 
Vuillemin’s Physique et métaphysique kantiennes of 1955 (Vuillemin, 1955) – which enabled 
him to resist the influence of existentialism.  Guéroult’s text was written quite specifically to 
reopen discussion of the relationship between dynamics and metaphysics, or, more generally, 
between science and philosophy in the work of Leibniz.  The classical thesis had been that 
Leibniz’s philosophy followed exclusively from his science whereas the scholarship of the first 
decade of the 20th century, notably that of Russell in his The Philosophy of Leibniz (Russell, 
1900), translated into French in 1908 (Russell, 1908), and that of Couturat’s La Logique de 
Leibniz of 1902 (Couturat, 1902), had argued the reverse, that Leibniz’s metaphysics had 
followed completely from his logic and, above all, from his mathematical research.  Guéroult’s 
text followed in detail the development of Leibniz’s philosophy of science.  In his earliest 
works, of the 1670s, Leibniz opposed modern physicists like Galileo and Wren who supposed 
that laws of motion could be deduced from the simple observation of the movement of bodies.  
For early Leibniz, abstract, a priori laws of motion make possible the understanding of sensible 
movements.  Although he was inclined to oppose crude empiricism, he nevertheless realised that 
there often appeared to be a disparity between the laws of abstract and concrete physics.  As 
Guéroult puts it, Leibniz tried to overcome this disparity by arguing that ‘to pass from abstract 
laws to the concrete world, we have to suppose the intervention of the wisdom of God who 
creates an economy in the world such that the proximate effects of abstract laws are modified by 
their distant effects, so much so that there result entirely different real effects which are sensible 
phenomena’ (Guéroult, 1935, 12-3).  This hypothesis enabled Leibniz to advocate the discovery 
of the causes of current phenomena by regarding them as distant enactments of their abstract 
origins.  However, Guéroult shows that this conception did not enable Leibniz to understand the 
conservation of motion in the world and he was led to posit not just a principle of prime 
movement but, rather, a principle of ongoing participatory motion.  As Guéroult summarises: 
 
“Spirit is conceived of as the condition of the movement of which it constitutes the 
essence, and God is no longer the prime but rather the formal cause of universal 
harmony.  Metaphysics does not relate us simply to a substratum situated behind the 
phenomenal world which its laws are responsible for establishing but, rather it mingles 
with pure science for the latter cannot alone explain a phenomenon which seems at every 
moment to be conditioned by the action of spiritual power.  Left to its own resources, 
mechanism is incapable of supplying the principle … without which the positive element 
of nature would not know either how to diminish or increase.” (Guéroult, 1935, 17, my 
translation). 
 
However, the consequence of Leibniz’s transposition of God from abstract, metaphysical prime 
mover of the material world to immanent spritual presence in the physical world had the effect 
of liberating a vitalist, non-mechanical physics from metaphysics.  To re-establish the unity of 
metaphysics and physics following this dissociation, Guéroult suggests that there were two 
possible ways of thinking available to philosophers.  The first, he claims, was the way to be 
taken by Kant in his Attempt to introduce the concept of  Negative Magnitudes into philosophy 
(Versuch den Begriff der negativen Grössen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen) of 1763 (Kant, 
1992, 203-241)) whereby the opposition of forces in the physical world are taken to be the basis 
for re-thinking philosophy, whereas the second was the way taken by Leibniz in his mature 
philosophy of basing physical opposition in the purely rational. 
 
There is no time to do justice to Guéroult’s discussion of the complexity of the relationship 
between the development of the thought of Leibniz and that of Descartes and the Cartesians as 
well as of Galileo, Huyghens, and Newton.  There are two important points to make.  The first is 
that Leibniz rejected the empiricism of his contemporaries, but also rejected the Cartesian 
separation of mind and body, of thought from extended matter.  Leibniz struggled to advance the 
idea of an immanent, participatory logic involved in suffusing physical and metaphysical 
explanation as well as suffusing physical and metaphysical forces.  For Leibniz there were 
separable truths of reason and truths of fact, but the two constantly inter-related.  The second 
point is that Guéroult’s text on several occasions explicitly cites Leibniz’s Animadversiones in 
evidence that Leibniz, by the time that it was written in 1692, had articulated clearly his view of 
the inadequacies of Cartesianism.  Equally, Guéroult on several occasions compares the solution 
adopted by Leibniz with the one which was to be adopted by Kant in his essay on Negative 
Magnitudes.  Tacitly, Guéroult seems to be attempting to retrieve Leibniz’s philosophical 
solution from the neo-Kantian interpretation of both Leibniz and Kant offered by Ernst Cassirer.  
Both of these points of reference in Guéroult suggest to me that Bourdieu’s early thought about 
philosophy and the social sciences could not fail to have been informed by the pre-Kantian and 
Kantian arguments in respect of the relationship between logic and scientific explanation.  This 
direct influence is confirmed by the explicit reference in the conclusion to Les Héritiers 
(Bourdieu & Passeron, 1964b, 104-5) to an analogy between the measurement of educational 
achievement and the Kantian assessment of moral behaviour which, for Kant, was a relational 
assessment based upon the relevance for philosophy of expressing differences of motivation in 
terms of counterposing negative and positive magnitudes of force rather than in terms of 
negativity defined logically as contradiction.  For Bourdieu and Passeron, the logic of 
contradiction imposed a dualistic, pass/fail attitude to educational achievement whereas a 
differently based logic carried the possibility of acknowledging relationally degrees of 
performance and of recognizing the worth of overcoming handicap rather than the attainment of 
absolute standards. 
 
In the final section of this paper, I want to try to highlight the extent to which, grounded in this 
familiarity with 17th and 18th century debates in the philosophy of science, Bourdieu’s work 
manifests an exploration of the implications of the same issues for social science.  We have to 
constantly show that his work was not dualistic and, importantly for our relation to his work 
since his death, we have to avoid relating dualistically to reifications of his concepts.  In other 
words, I want to insist on the multi-variate relationalism of his work and the need for a multi-
variate relationalism in our response to that work.  Methodologically, Bourdieu’s work of the 
1960s was already committed to the view that the ‘findings’ of research should contain within 
themselves a presentation of the logic of their derivation5.  As early as Travail et travailleurs en 
Algérie Bourdieu wrestled with the difficulty of representing discursively situations of multiple 
difference.  The text was in two parts, the first of which was a statistical analysis of Algerian 
society, and the second of which discussed issues, such as changing attitudes to work, based on 
conversations undertaken during an ethnographic study.  Some of these conversations were 
offered as transcripts in appendices and Bourdieu also wrote an introductory section to Part I 
which he called “Statistics and Sociology”.  This introduction advocated a procedural dialectic 
between statistical and ethnographic analysis and the full text embodied this dialectic in the 
relationship between the parts.  As such, therefore, the emphasis of dialectic remained a form of 
discursive dualism.  The same could be said of the form of Bourdieu’s early article on his home 
region of Béarn:  “Célibat et condition paysanne” (1962b) as well as of the form of the 
relationship between the transmission of his early educational research first as a working paper 
of the Centre de Sociologie Européenne entitled “Les étudiants et leurs études” (Bourdieu & 
Passeron, 1964a) and secondly in the publication, Les Héritiers (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1964b).  
The combined presentation tried to articulate the dialectical reciprocity between data and 
interpretation  The same could also be said about La reproduction of 1970 (Bourdieu & 
Passeron, 1970).  The problem was explicitly addressed from the first sentence of the Foreword 
to the first French edition.  Bourdieu and Passeron wrote: 
 
“The arrangement of this work in two books, at first sight very dissimilar in their mode 
of presentation, should not suggest the common conception of the division of intellectual 
labour between the piecemeal tasks of empirical inquiry and a self-sufficient theoretical 
activity.”  (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977, ix) 
 
It was all very well to make this initial assertion but, of course, the logical propositions have 
subsequently been extrapolated from the dialectical context of their production.  For our 
purposes, this is importantly the case in relation to the set of propositions with which the text 
begins which relate to the notion of ‘symbolic violence’.  The first proposition under the heading 
of ‘The Twofold arbitrariness of pedagogic action’ reads: 
“All pedagogic action (PA) is, objectively, symbolic violence insofar as it is the 
imposition of a cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary power.”  (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977, 
5) 
The problem here is that the very act of presenting this as a universal proposition both loses the 
immanence of its production in practice and also reduces the multiplicity of the relations of fact 
to the duality of a logical confrontation between a singular power and an implied singular victim 
– the imposition of a cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary power rather than the impositions of 
cultural arbitraries by arbitrary powers.  Formally and substantively, the book lay itself open to 
dualistic reception.  The same difficulty was there in Bourdieu’s article of 1966 entitled “Champ 
intellectuel et projet créateur” (Bourdieu, 1966a).  In discussing the productivity of creative 
artists in terms of a network of ‘field’ relations and of inter-acting forces rather than in terms of 
authorial self-expressive intent, Bourdieu was deploying the language of physics to apply to 
human relations.  The content of his argument was that artists can be located pluralistically in a 
continuum of positions which express diverging relations between writers and their publics, but 
the title conveyed the impression that the article was an elaboration of a dichotomous 
relationship between authors and fields.  The fact that the article first appeared in a number of 
                                         
5 For a more detailed discussion, see Robbins, D.M. (2007b) 
Les Temps Modernes devoted to the ‘Problems of Structuralism’ gave rise to the interpretation 
of Bourdieu as a ‘post-structuralist’, someone who analytically sought to convey the 
performance of agents in constructing the structures within which they operated as opposed to 
offering detached structural analysis.  So was born the persistent dualism of the so-called 
‘structure/agency’ debate. 
 
Only gradually in his career did Bourdieu overcome this tyranny of dualism.  Experientially, he 
confronted his situational dualism.  Immediately after his return from Algeria, he embarked on 
his analysis of his home region.  This was an attempt to explore the relationship between 
‘insider’ and outsider’ and ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ within his indigenous context rather than 
within a context which was objectively pre-defined dualistically in terms of ‘coloniser’ and 
‘colonised’.  A similar point could be made about his educational research of the 1960s.  The 
analyses leading to Les Héritiers were of students of Philosophy and Sociology and of 
provincial students studying in central universities – deliberate objective case-studies of his own 
career trajectory in transition from Philosophy to Sociology and from the provinces to Paris.  
Whereas Bourdieu initially liked to see himself as a provincial person who was not at ease in 
Parisian society, he began to embrace his multiple identity, discarding spatial duality and 
accommodating a relationalism which  enabled him to begin to see himself as a citizen of the 
world.  Much of his work of the 1990s relates to a comparable tension between his sense of 
French nationalism and his interest in developing internationalism.  The difficulty was to avoid 
dualistic, national antagonisms so as to recommend a properly relational analysis of international 
relations.  The late article which Bourdieu co-authored with Loic Wacquant – “Les ruses de la 
raison impérialiste” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1999) - is an interesting case in point.  Much of the 
article comes across as aggressively anti-American, but Bourdieu made an introductory footnote 
in which he insisted: 
“It bears stressing at the outset to avoid any misunderstanding – and to ward off the 
predictable accusation of ‘anti-Americanism’ – that nothing is more universal than the 
pretension to the universal or, more accurately, to the universalization of a particular 
vision of the world;  and that the demonstration sketched here would hold mutatis 
mutandis, for other fields and other countires (notably for France …)”  (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1999, 52) 
and in which he proceeded to refer to his earlier article, entitled “Deux impérialismes de 
l’universel” (Bourdieu, 1992) in which he had analysed the conceptual imperialism involved in 
the international transmission of the ideology of the French Revolution.  During the 1990s, 
Bourdieu specifically emphasized his place within a peculiarly French intellectual tradition and 
focused increasingly on involvement in French politics, but he always insisted that it was a 
characteristic of French particularity to aspire towards internationally dominating social 
explanation and that this was a characteristic which had to be understood relationally as such. 
 
This same late text, in its content, was also an attack on discursive dualism.  The focus of the 
article is on the way in which North American analyses of Latin American race relations had 
imposed a dualistic Black/White categorisation which failed to register the complexity of 
Hispanic culture.  It has to be said that in rhetorically exposing this inadequacy of North 
American inspired race relations analysis, suggesting that dualistic analysis was itself a form of 
symbolic violence, Bourdieu and Wacquant tended to reinforce dualism by presenting American 
research as dualistically exercising domination over indigenous Latin American culture.  The 
confrontation between research and reality should logically have been presented relationally.   
 
I can only sketch the way in which the progression of the concept of habitus was an attempt on 
Bourdieu’s part to escape from the framework of dualistic acculturation in which it had been 
first developed.  In the early texts, the concept of habitus clearly served the function of 
mediating between dualistic orientations.  The implicit argument of the early educational 
research was that educational performance could not satisfactorily be explained by a static 
correlation between student achievement and class background.  The concept of habitus 
mediated initially between the poles of mechanism and finalism and sought to find a way of 
indicating that educational achievement was not a reflection of a static disparity between 
working class culture and the culture of the socially dominant but, rather, a factor in an ongoing 
relationalism over time in which the attitudes of the participants were instrumental in affecting 
their own life-chances.  It was only gradually that Bourdieu managed to communicate multi-
dimensionality outside a dualistic framework.  One of the achievements of La distinction 
(Bourdieu, 1979, 1986a) is that it tries to represent the function of taste in an immanent process 
of participatory position-taking which is captured statically but in which future trajectories are 
shown to be latent.  As social attitudes changed, Bourdieu knew that the concept of habitus had 
first functioned in a context in which the influence of the family in producing inter-generational 
attitude change had still been potent.  It was assumed that individuals inherited prior family 
values and lived their lives by adjusting their personal aspirations in relation to this inheritance.  
The position-taking which was at first perceived dualistically because, socially, it still was 
dualistic gradually shifted in Bourdieu’s thought towards a more thoroughly relational view of 
the world in which individuals inter-act in their own terms, like the monads or entelechies of 
Leibniz. 
 
I would like to trace the way in which Bourdieu’s analytical work adjusted reciprocally in 
relation to social change.  I think that he gradually found a way to represent relationalism during 
the 1970s.  There are many early articles in which Bourdieu wrestled with the relationship 
between the logic of division in the process of perception and the actuality of division in 
observed phenomena.  Many titles are indicative, focusing on difference and distinction, class 
and classification and categorisation.  I can just refer you to these:  “Différences et distinctions” 
(Bourdieu, 1966b); “Condition de classe et position de classe” (Bourdieu, 1966c); “Champ du 
pouvoir, champ intellectuel et habitus de classe” (Bourdieu, 1971a);  “Classes et classement” 
(Bourdieu, 1973); “Avenir de classe et causalité du probable” (Bourdieu, 1974a);  “Les fractions 
de la classe dominante et les modes d’appropriation des oeuvres d’art” (Bourdieu, 1974b); “Les 
catégories de l’entendement professoral” (Bourdieu, 1975); “Les modes de domination” 
(Bourdieu, 1976a); “La production de l’idéologie dominante” (Bourdieu, 1976b); “Une classe 
objet” (Bourdieu, 1977); “Classement, déclassement, reclassement” (Bourdieu, 1978).  These all 
repay attention in the terms which I have tried to set out, as examples of attempts to avoid the 
consequences of a dualistic representation of multiple reality, but I want to finish by referring to 
one little-known article which focused briefly and quite specifically on the issue which I have 
wanted to highlight.  It was an article which was published in English in 1971 in the Times 
Literary Supplement.  As far as I know it was never published in French and, according to the 
Bibliography of Bourdieu’s work produced by Yvette Delsaut and Marie-Christine Rivière, it 
has only been translated into Japanese (in 1986) (Delsaut & Rivière, 2002, 28).  It was called 
“The Thinkable and the Unthinkable”.  It begins by characterising ‘two diametrically opposed 
positions’ in theories of culture, the structuralist and the functionalist, but it moves quickly to a 
discussion of the poweful effects of dualistic thinking.  Bourdieu wrote: 
 
“Since symbolic systems derive their structures from the systematic application of one 
single principium divisionis and can organize our representation of the natural and social 
world only by dividing it up into antagonistic classes;  since they provide both meaning 
and a consensus on meaning by way of the logic of inclusion and exclusion, they are 
predisposed by their very structure to fulfil the simultaneous functions of inclusion and 
exclusion, association and dissociation, integration and distinction.  Only in so far as it 
has as its logical and gnosiological function to order the world and to establish 
agreement about the world does the ruling culture fulfil its ideological – that is, political 
– function of legitimizing an arbitrary order;  more accurately, it is because, as a 
structured structure, it reproduces in transfigured and therefore unrecognizable form, the 
structure of prevalent socio-economic relationships that as a structuring structure – and 
therefore as a problématique – it produces a representation of the social world 
immediately adjusted to the structure of socio-economic relationships, which are 
consequently perceived as natural, so contributing to the symbolic buttressing of the 
existing balance of forces. 
 In short, culture classfies – and classifies the classifiers.”  (Bourdieu, 1971a, 1255) 
 
For me, this beautifully expresses Bourdieu’s anguish about the tyranny of dualistic analysis.  
He knew that he had to counter-act dualism both in the content and the form of his work so as to 
avoid allowing his analysis of symbolic violence to become itself a form of symbolic violence.  
We have to preserve Bourdieu’s vigilant sensitivity in our work and in our use of his work for 
our purposes.  
 
 
One way to summarise my argument is to suggest that I have shown that Bourdieu did not cease 
to ‘be a philosopher’ after his training at the Ecole Normale Supérieure and become a 
‘sociologist’ in the 1960s.  Rather the progression of his philosophical thinking logically 
entailed sociological solutions to epistemological problems.  My contention is that we can 
deploy Bourdieu’s work in our own research as long as we recognise that his thinking was 
relational and that the heuristic concepts which he developed – such as ‘symbolic violence’ – 
were interventions which related dialectically with the objective social conditions of his 
experience.  We have to respond relationally, testing whether the use of his concepts involves 
the resuscitation of their philosophical origins or their pragmatic deployment on the grounds that 
his sociological practice successfully exorcised those origins.  The trap to be avoided is perhaps 
best illustrated by a brief comparison between the work of Bourdieu and Lyotard.  I have no 
evidence to suggest that Bourdieu knew or used Lyotard’s early introduction to Phenomenology 
(Lyotard, 1954), but it has always seemed to me that Lyotard’s discussion of ‘Phenomenology 
and the Human Sciences’ throws light on the way in which Bourdieu’s reading of Husserl 
influenced the development of his sociological thinking.  Lyotard argued that  
 
“… phenomenology was led inevitably, by the very fact that it is not a metaphysics but a 
philosophy of the concrete, to take hold of sociological data in order to clarify itself, and 
equally to put into question the procedures by which sociologists obtain this data, in 
order to clarify sociology”. (Lyotard, 1991, 75) 
 
This sentence provides the rationale both for Bourdieu’s description of his ethnographic work in 
Algeria as ‘Fieldwork in Philosophy’ (the title, in English, given in the French publication, in 
Choses dites [Bourdieu, 1987] of the interview with Honneth, Kocyba, and Schwibs) and for the 
development of his ‘reflexive’ sociology.  Bourdieu and Lyotard were similarly influenced by 
Husserl, but the important distinction is that Bourdieu positioned himself within the discourse of 
sociology whereas Lyotard positioned himself within the discourse of philosophy.  Much of 
Lyotard’s discussion in Le Différend (Lyotard, 1983) could be said to relate to the phenomenon 
of linguistic symbolic violence, and it is no accident that most of the contents of Bourdieu’s Ce 
que parler veut dire (Bourdieu, 1982) were included in an English text which was given the title 
Language and Symbolic Power (Bourdieu, 1991) which Bourdieu adopted when the original 
French version was reissued in 2001 (Bourdieu, 2001).  In the opening paragraph of Le 
Différend, Lyotard states that a ‘differend’ “would be a conflictual case between two parties (at 
least) which could not be resolved equitably in the absence of a judgemental rule applicable to 
the two arguments” (Lyotard, 1983, 9).  He concludes the paragraph by commenting that 
 
“The title of the book suggests (through the generic use of the article) that a universal 
rule of judgement between heterogeneous genres is generally lacking.” (Lyotard, 1983, 
9). 
 
Lyotard’s book offers a philosophical discussion of judgemental incommensurability, conducted 
in a way which still operates with the spectre of communicative dualism as well as in relation to 
autonomous discourse.  The first sentence betrays the assumption that conflictual cases are 
bipartisan rather than multiple and betrays Lyotard’s disinclination to analyse communication 
sociologically.  By contrast, Bourdieu moved away from a dualistic representation of symbolic 
violence towards a recognition of multivariate factors operating in exchanges of power, all of 
which have to be understood sociologically. 
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